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BREAKING JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT 
DEADLOCKS: BEFORE THE TEXAS SHOOT-OUT, 
TRY A TEXAS SHOUT-OUT 






I. The Scene 
“TEXAS SHOOT-OUT!” The very name evokes an image of two fidgety 
gunslingers faced off on a hot and dusty Laredo Wild West street. Each 
struggles with second thoughts about having accepted a fateful challenge 
they might not live to regret. 
                                                                                                                 
 * Special Counsel, Mayer Brown. 
 ** Associate, Mayer Brown. 
The authors wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Holly Kingingham while a 
summer intern at Mayer Brown, in particular in compiling Annexes 2 and 3. We also wish to 
thank Norman´s sister, Nina Rose, for supplying the dueling cowboys sketch. 
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Fast forward to the modern world of 50/50 joint ventures where the “Texas 
Shoot-out” clause (“TSO”) is a popular, but often dreaded, voting deadlock-
breaking method (“DBM”). We will describe below the TSO in its classic 
form and context and outline a few other options. More importantly, we will 
suggest how to make a draconian TSO both more palatable to wary clients 
and less prone to undesired and irreversible consequences. Indeed, we 
believe that placing a well-drafted Texas Shout-out within a well-considered 
joint venture agreement (“JVA”) may well provide an ounce of prevention 
worth a pound of cure. 
This article focuses upon the 50/50 business joint venture (“JV”) where 
deadlocks are particularly challenging to break. 
II. The Landscape  
JVs resemble marriages in a number of ways: 
$ There are no guarantees of success; 
$ Their duration depends a lot on circumstances and parties´ 
attitudes going in; 
$ Frictions inevitably occur over time that hopefully can be resolved 
amicably; 
$ Money does not solve all problems – but it sure helps! 
$ “Shotguns” sometimes play a role; and 
$ Chances of success (or at least an equitable parting) can be 
enhanced through a well-considered pre-nuptial (i.e., JVA). 
For present purposes, let us focus upon the last bullet—the JVA—and in 
particular, upon its DBM provisions. As with marriages, joint ventures may 
thrive for years, to each party’s benefit, only to grind to a halt upon 
unforeseen circumstances, detrimental events, or simply, a change of heart. 
The result can be any combination of stagnation, decreased revenues, lost 
profits, credit woes, employee discontent and, ultimately, insolvency. The 
effective JVA drafter foresees such impasses and forges a fit-for-purpose 
DBM to avoid calamity and allow for a seamless transition to a new phase of 
the JV, hopefully to the benefit of both parties.  
As always, there is more than one way to skin a cat. This article will 
describe the available alternatives but focus on the TSO for the reasons cited 
in Section IV. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss3/2
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III. Alternate Approaches1 
Shoot-out provisions are like trips to the dentist. No one likes them, but 
they are a necessary evil if you are involved in, or advising, a 50/50 JV. 
Designed to end deadlocks, they reflect the reality that even the best 
intentioned and deftly structured JVs may eventually reach an intractable 
voting impasse on a fundamental issue. Like marriages that begin with toasts, 
speeches, and big smiles, experience shows that some marriages and most 
joint ventures will eventually run their course, often due to a crucial 
deadlock. A variety of deadlock provisions exists to address a variety of 
deadlock causes. 
We describe below the most common types of such provisions. Typically, 
their application portends a radical transformation, if not the end of, the JV 
per se. Some of the provisions are less drastic than others, even permitting 
intervention by a neutral third party. Nevertheless, these provisions are often 
drastic when applied, as they do not allow adequate opportunity for dueling 
parties to defuse. 
1. Russian Roulette. Under this option, Party A sets the terms and price of 
Party B’s 50% participating interest (“PI”), whereupon Party B decides 
whether to sell or buy on those terms (essentially, “I cut, you choose”). For 
example, fed up with Larry, Rebecca notifies him that she is willing to either 
purchase his interest or sell her interest at an indicated price. Larry then has 
a defined period to decide and counterpropose. A JVA employing this DBM 
should provide ample time for Party B (Larry) to consider his options. In 
theory, this approach forces Party A (Rebecca) to propose a reasonable PI 
value, since she will be on the hook to sell or buy at the trigger price, 
depending on Larry’s election.2  
2. Mexican Shoot-out. In this case each Party submits to the other a sealed 
bid indicating the minimum price for which it would be prepared to sell its 
50% share. Whichever sealed bid is higher “wins,” and that bidder then buys 
the “loser’s” share at the price indicated in the loser’s sealed bid. This 
approach, also known as the “Dutch Auction,” differs from the TSO in that 
the focus is on the selling price rather than the buying price. 
3. Appraisal Method. Under this method, a qualified expert provides an 
independent appraisal of the value of the PI in question (“Appraised Value”). 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See the checklist at Annex 2 for a handy side-by-side comparison of various 
contractual and non-contractual DBM approaches. 
 2. Carsten Beith et al., Challenging Transactions: Confronting Difficult Regulatory, 
Tax, Antitrust, and Business Issues in Hospital to Hospital Transactions and Hospital-
Physician Arrangements, 20160627 AHLA SEMINAR PAPERS 31. 
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Used in conjunction with a buy-out provision, the appraisal method 
determines valuation through the parties’ choice of: (1) an agreed single 
appraiser, (2) an average of two appraisals (one appraiser chosen by each 
party), (3) an average of the two closest appraisals among a wider set of 
appraisals, (4) a premium on, or discount from, the Appraised Value, based 
on the reason for the dissolution (or some other factor, such as breach of the 
JVA), or (5) an appraiser’s choice between each party’s valuation of the PI.3 
Typically, the JVA will define the specific appraisal to be used in case of a 
qualifying voting deadlock. 
Of course, hybrids are always a possibility. For example, Larry and 
Rebecca might agree upon the following variation: Upon deadlock, Rebecca 
and Larry each select an appraiser. If the resulting appraisals fall within a 
defined percentage or price threshold of each other and are comparable, the 
Appraised Value will be the average of the two. Failing which, the two party-
selected appraisers choose a third appraiser to make the final appraisal 
(within the range of the first two). 
The appraisal approach is less drastic than its “Russian” and “Mexican” 
counterparts, but it also requires more time and cost and deprives the 
combatants of their ability, in effect, to control their own fate.4 
4. Outside Tiebreaker. The parties may also refer to a designated 
tiebreaker as a DBM. When this provision is invoked, the parties call upon a 
specified, pre-designated third party to break the deadlock. A variation of this 
method requires the tiebreaker to decide how the deadlock is resolved by 
making certain, specific determinations, which the parties decide beforehand 
will resolve the dispute. Tiebreakers benefit from being generally easy to 
draft and generally allow the JV to continue. Indeed, a well-drafted tiebreaker 
may remain available to resolve subsequent disputes. The JV partners may 
find it difficult to agree upon a third-party tiebreaker due to concerns about 
impartiality. Candidates unfamiliar with the day-to-day operations of the 
business may understandably be weary of being forced to make potentially 
uninformed decisions. 
5. Inside Tiebreaker. To avoid the prospect of the partiality or 
unfamiliarity of the outside tiebreaker, an inside tie-breaking clause calls for 
the party-nominated director (or other designated representatives) to take 
turns casting the deciding vote in qualifying impasses. Some believe, 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Similar to a baseball arbitration. See, Josh Chetwynd, Play Ball? An Analysis of Final-
Offer Arbitration, Its Use in Major League Baseball and Its Potential Applicability to 
European Football Wage and Transfer Disputes, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 109, 110-111 
(2009). 
 4. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss3/2
2020]    Breaking Joint Venture Agreement Deadlocks 415 
 
 
however, that this type of provision unwisely leaves to chance an important 
decision in which owners expect to have equal say. Worse yet, some critics 
of this approach say it encourages gamesmanship where each party attempts 
to stall a crucial decision until it has the deciding rotational vote.5 
6. Chance. Of course, there is always the que será approach, which 
unapologetically leaves the entire matter to chance by, say, a coin toss. 
Although this option may seem precipitous, some parties consider it the 
fairest of all. This bold mechanism can be incorporated into deadlock 
provisions in a variety of ways, but it ultimately resolves deadlock matters 
through luck (or lack thereof, as the case may be).6 
7. Texas Shootout (see Section V below). 
IV. Non-Contractual DBM Approaches 
Other common deadlock alternatives exist—although none of them 
especially pleasant—in the absence of a DBM. Like intestate death, some of 
these alternatives result from failure to plan and force a strictly legal 
resolution. 
1. Custodian or Receivership. A custodian or receiver may be appointed 
when the “members’ division is so severe that it prevents the orderly 
operation of the business and threatens the entity with irreparable injury.”7 In 
such case, an appointed custodian or receiver runs the enterprise. The 
disadvantages here are obvious. “[C]ustomers, creditors and suppliers still 
may be put off. They may refuse to deal with the corporation on the same 
terms as before and may insist on protecting themselves to a greater degree.”8 
2. Involuntary or Judicial Dissolution. A court might mandate a private 
auction for the business in which each party provides the other a sealed bid; 
the high bidder becomes the buyer while the low bidder becomes the seller 
(at the higher price).9 
3. Injunction. One of the parties to a JV impasse might seek injunctive 
relief from a court. If granted, the court might compel or prohibit certain 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Kenneth J. Vanko, Dissolution and Rational Choice: The Unique Remedial 
Framework for Director Deadlock Under the Illinois Business Corporation Act, 38 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 348, 376 (2018). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Louis T. M. Conti et al., Deadlock-Breaking Mechanisms in LLCs—Flipping a Coin 
is Not Good Enough, but Is Better Than Dissolution, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar. 2017. 
 8. Eileen A. Lindsay, What Can I Do for You? Remedies for Oppressed Shareholders in 
New Jersey, 204-AUG. N.J. LAW. 37, at 37, 39. 
 9. Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial 
Resolution of Business Deadlock, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 213 (2014). 
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conduct in order to overcome the impasse. While potentially beneficial, 
injunctive resolutions present inherent downsides. “Although an injunction 
theoretically allows for the continuance of the company’s business, it does 
not resolve deadlock, it holds a bad relationship together, and it is difficult to 
obtain due to a high standard of proof.”10 
V. The Texas Shootout 
We have chosen to focus upon the Texas Shoot-out because we (i) practice 
law in its namesake State and (ii) believe this DBM may often be the lesser 
of necessary evils when implemented judiciously and in appropriate 
circumstances. 
In its classic form, the TSO, when triggered by either JV party, requires 
each JV party to offer to buy the other’s entire interest in the JV at the price 
indicated in a sealed bid. Typically, JV parties submit their bids to a third 
party designated for such purpose in the JVA (“Referee”) who opens and 
communicates the bids to the JV parties as provided in the JVA. The higher 
bidder is then obligated to purchase the lower bidder’s JV interest at the strike 
price.11 
The TSO is a fairly popular DBM for a variety of reasons. First, the TSO 
is simple in concept and implementation. Second, it allows for a rapid 
resolution of the deadlock, thus allowing the JV to continue operating 
normally once triggered and executed. Finally, it allows each JV party to 
determine, through earnest soul searching, the intrinsic value of its JV interest 
in light of all relevant circumstances. 
The TSO, like all “shotgun” scenarios (including weddings), has its 
drawbacks. First, it may lead to a precipitous divorce to the exclusion of a 
negotiated resolution that might allow the JV to survive. Second, under some 
circumstances, the TSO may favor the financially stronger or more informed 
party to the detriment of the other. Finally, if not properly drafted, the TSO 
may lead to acrimonious procedural spats and ultimately litigation, to the 
detriment of both parties and the JV itself.  
Upfront JVA negotiations, complemented by meticulous and balanced 
drafting, can maximize advantages and curtail drawbacks of the TSO. Key 
elements of this effort include: (i) identifying a qualifying voting impasse, 
(ii) clear and realistic notification periods, (iii) sufficient time and 
appropriate conditions to overcome the impasse, (iv) identification of a 
viable Referee, and (v) unequivocal TSO procedures. 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Conti et al., Deadlock-Breaking Mechanisms in LLCs at 1, 5. 
 11. See the footnote 7 in Annex 1 for another possible variant. 
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VI. Our Texas “Shout-Out” 
As indicated, the TSO suffers from the very characteristics that its name 
implies—a precipitous rush to a precarious showdown fraught with 
potentially needless dangers to the duelers and by-standers (creditors, 
customers, employees) alike. As DBM drafters, we prefer a Texas Shout-out 
to a Texas Shoot-out, in appropriate circumstances. 
A well-drafted Texas Shout-out clause allows the potential combatants 
adequate time and suitable procedures to amicably overcome an impasse 
prior to a potentially deadly showdown. And ideally, it requires a further final 
cooling-off period before either may shoot. In the end, however, the clause 
must allow either party to call the other’s bluff, letting the chips fall where 
they may, so that the JV may get on with business. 
Our suggested Texas Shout-out clause appears in Annex 1. It is intended 
as a model only and must be carefully modified to fit each set of 
circumstances.  
VII. Conclusion 
As with any commercial contract, the effective JVA drafter will consider 
both fairytale and nightmare decision-making scenarios. In particular, she 
must contemplate, and expertly provide for, an eventual partner stand-off 
threatening the very viability and continued existence of the venture. Section 
III outlined a variety of available contractual DBMs to consider. For the 
reasons stated, we believe that in many instances a properly drafted Texas 
Shout-out clause provides the best option, absent a crystal ball. Hopefully the 
above analysis, together with the suggested model clause and checklist, will 
facilitate that task. 
In any event, a wise JV dueler may do well to heed the admonition 
popularized by Kenny Rogers: 
      You’ve got to know when to hold ‘em 
      Know when to fold ‘em 
      Know when to walk away 
      And know when to run.12 




                                                                                                                 
 12. KENNY ROGERS, The Gambler, on THE GAMBLER (United Artists Group 1978). 
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MODEL TEXAS SHOUTOUT CLAUSE13 
Deadlock 
(a) If a vote of the General Assembly14 fails to agree on a Resolution 
proposed pursuant to Article [  ] whose adoption one Shareholder 
("Proponent") feels is essential for the proper administration or 
substantial achievement of the Company’s purposes as stated in the 
By-Laws15 (“Assertion”), the Proponent may initiate the following 
procedure to resolve the impasse ("Impasse"). 
(b) The Proponent may Notify the other Party of the Assertion within 15 
days of such vote, failing which the Proponent's right to raise the 
Assertion under this Article expires. 
(c) The Shareholders have 15 days from the date of Notification under 
(b) to resolve the Impasse, failing which the Proponent may request 
that the Expert16 provide, within 30 days, a written opinion 
confirming or denying the Assertion.17 
(d) If the Expert confirms the Assertion, the Company bears the Expert´s 
related costs. If the Expert denies the Assertion, the Proponent bears 
the Expert´s costs.  
(e) If the Expert confirms the Assertion, each Shareholder must use 
reasonable best efforts during the next 60 days18 to resolve the 
Impasse. 
(f)    Failing (e), either Shareholder may refer the Impasse to a Mediator19 
with target completion of 60 days.20 
  
                                                                                                                 
 13. The capitalized terms would be defined in the JVA. 
 14. The JVA could provide a different triggering event.  
 15. Reference to By-Laws here is optional.  
 16. The JVA would indicate the Expert, who could possibly be the Company´s auditor.  
 17. This presumes that an Expert has been lined up ahead of time for JVA consultations 
and that the rules of such engagement have been agreed.  
 18. This model calls for relatively long periods in hopes of allowing an amicable solution. 
The drafter might consider shorter periods, depending on the client’s preference. 
 19. This presumes that the JVA dispute resolution clause contains non-binding mediation 
provisions. 
 20. Some clients may not wish to provide for mediation. 
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(g) Following (f) each Shareholder must use reasonable best efforts 
during the next 30 days to resolve the Impasse. 
(h) Should (g) fail, each Shareholder must appoint a representative fully 
authorized to resolve the Impasse (“Representative”). At the request 
of either Shareholder, the Representatives must meet at the Expert's 
office (or other agreed location) at 9:00 a.m. on a day, within 15 days 
of such request, agreed by the Shareholders or failing which, chosen 
by the Expert ("Meeting"). 
(i)    Should the Meeting fail to resolve the Impasse by 5:00 p.m., each 
Representative must, by 5:00 p.m. the following Business Day,21 
submit a sealed envelope to the Expert containing a firm offer, stated 
in US Dollars cash, to purchase the other Shareholder’s 
Shareholding.  
(j)    The Expert must immediately show the offers to the Representatives 
and provide them authenticated copies. 
(k) The Shareholder who makes the higher offer must purchase the 
offered Shareholding at the price it offered.22 




                                                                                                                 
 21. The JVA parties may wish to allow a longer period here. 
 22. Alternatively, the lower bidder may be given the choice to (i) purchase the high 
bidder’s interest at the higher price or (ii) sell its interest to the higher bidder at the higher 
offered price. 
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ANNEX 2 
DESCRIPTION OF DEADLOCK BREAKING MECHANISMS 
 
TYPE OVERVIEW MECHANICS, EXAMPLES, & NOTES SOURCES 
Appraisal A qualified expert 
provides an 
independent 
appraisal of the 
value of the 
interest to be 
purchased or sold 
Used in conjunction with a buy-out provision, an appraisal mechanism determines 
valuation through: 
 An agreed single appraiser  
 An average of two appraisals (one appraiser chosen by each party) 
 An average of the two closest appraisals out of a set number 
 A premium on or discount from the appraised value, based on the reason for 
the dissolution (or some other factor) 
 An appraiser’s choice between each party’s valuation 
 
Example: 
Upon deadlock, each party selects an appraiser. If the resulting appraisals are 
comparable, then an average of the two appraisals will be the valuation. If not, the 
two selected appraisers choose an additional appraiser to make the ultimate 
appraisal. 
Carsten Beith et al., Challenging 
Transactions: Confronting Difficult 
Regulatory, Tax, Antitrust, and Business 
Issues in Hospital to Hospital Transactions 
and Hospital-Physician Arrangements, 
20160627 AHLA SEMINAR PAPERS 31 
(2016). 
 
John W. Welch, Practical Guide to Forming 
A Partnership in Utah, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 
111, 135 (1997). 
Russian 
Roulette 
One party sets the 
terms and price of 
a 50% interest, 
and the other party 
decides whether 
they want to sell 
or buy on those 
terms (essentially, 
“I cut, you 
choose”) 
One party determines the buy-out terms and the other party decides if they want to 
buy or sell on those terms. 
 
Example: 
Party A notifies Party B, that she is willing to either purchase B’s interest at a 
specified price or sell her own interest at the same price. Upon notification, B then 
has a set period of time to elect either to purchase A’s interest at the set price or 
sell his interest to A at the set price. 
 
Note:  
These clauses are rarely invoked because they involve guaranteed dissolution of 
the joint venture but can be useful in situations where the members (or at least the 
triggering member) no longer wishes to remain in a business relationship with the 
other party. 
Business Transactions Solutions § 65:62 
 





Each party to a 
joint venture 
Both parties submit sealed bids to a third party. The party with the highest bid 
must buy out the other party at that price. 




makes an offer 
through sealed 
bidding to buy out 
the other party 
 
Example:  
If Party A submits a bid of $100 and Party B submits a bid of $125, then B must 
purchase A’s interest for $125.  
 
Note:  
Information asymmetries can be mitigated but only if the parties “anticipate at the 
time of drafting their business agreement which of the two owners will have better 
information.” 
Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 
Shotguns and Deadlocks, 31 YALE J. ON 
REG. 143, 163 (2014). 
 
Peter B. Ladig, Death by Auction: Can We 
Do Better?, 73 BUS. LAW. 53, 80 (2018). 
Dutch Auction This is a variation 
of the Texas 
Shootout 
Both parties submit sealed bids stating their minimum price to a third party. The 
highest bidder must purchase the other party’s interest at the lower price. 
 
Example:  
If Party A submits her (minimum) bid of $100 and Party B submits his (minimum) 
bid of $125, then B must purchase A’s interest for $100.  
Carsten Beith et al., Challenging 
Transactions. 
Tie Breaker The parties refer 
the issue to a 
designated tie 
breaker 





o Tie-breaker clauses are easy to draft. 
o The appointment of a designated tie breaker “does not carry the stigma 
that a receiver or custodian does; therefore, such an appointment does 
not have the impact on creditor and customer relations that other kinds 
of appointments do.” 
o A tie breaker can potentially remain available to help resolve future 
disputes. 
 Disadvantages: 
o “[F]ew likely are willing to undertake this endeavor.” 
o “[A]n outsider who is not familiar with the day-to-day business of the 
corporation may fear liability from making a key business judgment or 
may not understand enough to make that judgment in the first place.” 
Kenneth J. Vanko, Dissolution and Rational 
Choice: The Unique Remedial Framework 
for Director Deadlock Under the Illinois 
Business Corporation Act, 38 N. ILL. U. L. 
REV. 348, 376 (2018). 
 
Eileen A. Lindsay, What Can I Do for You? 
Remedies for Oppressed Shareholders in 
New Jersey, 204-AUG N.J. LAW. 37, 39 
(2000). 
 
Flip a Coin Decisions are 
determined by a 
coin flip 
This kind of mechanism can be incorporated into deadlock provisions in a variety 
of ways. 
 
Stevens A. Carey, Real Estate Venture Exit 
Strategy Provisions, 33 PRAC. REAL EST. 
LAW. 41, 49 (2017). 
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Example (buy-out context):  
If the selling member of the buy-out is “concerned that a bulk transaction could 
result in a discount because, among other matters, the venture’s properties may be 
at different stages of development and the properties may be ready for sale (or may 
experience a peak or depression in value) at different times,” the parties can 
alleviate this concern through a process whereby the parties “value each of the 
properties, then flip a coin and take turns selecting properties until one member 
gets within a certain range of its share of the values (and a final adjustment is then 
made in cash).” 
 
Example (arbitration context):  
An agreement that provides for arbitration may require the selected arbitrator to 
come from a pool provided by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). If the 
parties cannot agree on an arbitrator, then the AAA “will provide a list of three 
available retired judges, and each [party] may strike one of the available retired 
judges. The remaining retired judge shall resolve the issue.” However, if the 
parties both strike the same potential arbitrator, then they “shall flip a coin to 
determine which of the retired judges shall make the determination.”  
Drafting Partnership Agreements and 
Operating Agreements: Selected Issues, 
SK011 ALI-ABA 179 , 290 
Rotating Vote The parties 
alternate the role 
of tie-breaking 
vote whenever 
there is a deadlock 
on a decision 
The parties take alternating turns casting the decisive vote. 
 
Note:  
 This kind of mechanism, however, is “inconsistent with the purpose of an 
equally-divided firm. Owners expect to have an equal say in management, 
which corresponds to an unfettered veto right, regardless of whether that right 
ultimately proves to be judicious.”  
 This kind of provision encourages parties to “game the system and feign 
deadlock over secondary issues in the hopes of gaining a deciding vote on 
more critical ones.” 







works only in 
limited 
circumstances, 
such as where the 
assets or activities 
are easily 
 “Where the assets of a corporation consist primarily of separate parcels of 
land or buildings, partition may afford more effective relief than a buy-out. 
Each shareholder can then have his or her expectations of real estate 
ownership — albeit on a smaller scale — met.” 
 “Partition might also be preferable in cases where customer lists (perhaps in 
different geographic areas) could be split, or in a case where one business 
could be readily divided in half. In many cases, where the second or third 





business itself or 
where the value of 
the assets is easily 
identified or 
agreed upon 
generations in family-owned businesses cannot get along — but both sides 
want to continue with some part of the family enterprise — partition may be 
more appropriate than a buy-out. The parties’ expectations of continuing in 
management — and in the family business — are then met.” 
 “[S]ome adjustment must be made to accommodate for the fact that one party 




Court intervention Example:  
A court might mandate a private auction in which the parties participate in a 
sealed-bid auction and the party with the highest bid becomes the buyer and the 
other party becomes the seller (at the higher price). 





A custodian may 
be appointed when 
the “members’ 
division is so 
severe that it 
prevents the 
orderly operation 
of the business 
and threatens the 
entity with 
irreparable injury” 
An appointed custodian runs the venture. 
 
Note: 
 Although the term custodian is less onerous than receiver, “customers, 
creditors and suppliers still may be put off. They may refuse to deal with the 
corporation on the same terms as before, and may insist on protecting 
themselves to a greater degree.” These issues can be minimized if the 
custodian works through the parties rather than supplants them entirely. 
 “A custodian who is not a ‘fast study’ may actually exacerbate the situation if 
he or she is not able to steer the corporate ship — which may already be 
foundering — effectively. The [parties] may find [themselves] rearranging 
deck chairs on a ship that is still going down — only under the stewardship of 
a different captain.” 
Eileen A. Lindsay, What Can I Do for You?  
 
Louis T. M. Conti et al., Deadlock-Breaking 
Mechanisms in LLCs—Flipping a Coin is 
Not Good Enough, but Is Better Than 
Dissolution, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar. 2017. 
 




“Although an injunction theoretically allows for the continuance of the company’s 
business, it does not resolve deadlock, it holds a bad relationship together, and it is 
difficult to obtain due to a high standard of proof.” 
Conti et. al., Deadlock-Breaking 




requiring a party 
to perform a 
specific act 
This alternative “features the unfortunate characteristic of forcibly keeping a 
contentious relationship together without providing a method to resolve future 
deadlock.” 
Conti et. al., Deadlock-Breaking 
Mechanisms in LLCs, at 1, 5 
Judicial 
Expulsion 
Removal of a 
member from the 
enterprise 
Expulsion can be effectuated “by judicial order in a case in which a member’s 
wrongful conduct adversely and materially affects the company’s activities and 
affairs, constitutes a willful or persistent and material breach of the operating 
Louis T. M. Conti & Gregory M. Marks, 
Florida’s New Revised LLC Act, Part III, 88 
FLA. B.J. 34 (2014). 
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agreement, violates fiduciary duties or other statutory standards of conduct … or 
makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s activities and affairs 
with that person as a member.” 




“Mediation is useful in situations where the parties are motivated to compromise, 
but it may be fruitless when the parties are so hostile and entrenched that 
compromise is impossible.” 
Louis T. M. Conti et al., Deadlock-Breaking 
Mechanisms in LLCs. 
 
Arbitration A process “to 
obtain a resolution 
in an adversary 
manner more 
quickly than might 
occur in state or 
federal court” 
Example: 
“Any controversy or dispute arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the 
breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration. Such arbitration shall be effected by 
arbitrators selected as hereinafter provided. The dispute shall be submitted to three 
arbitrators each of whom shall have had at least ten (10) years’ experience in the 
restaurant business, one arbitrator being selected by each Manager … the two 
designated arbitrators shall pick the third. The decision of a majority of the 
arbitrators shall be binding on all parties.” 
Operating agreement for two manager, four 
member Limited Liability Company LLC 
with voting and nonvoting members and 
anti-deadlock provisions as to managers’ 
actions, 15 MASS. PRAC., LEGAL FORMS § 
13:8 (5th ed. 2019) 
 
Conti et. al., Deadlock-Breaking 





COMPARISON OF DEADLOCK BREAKING MECHANISMS 
 
 
















to be efficient 
Slice-of-the-pie Provisions 
Appraisal     
Russian Roulette     
Texas Shootout     
Dutch Auction     
Other Provisions 
Tie Breaker     
Flip a Coin [Varies by use] [Varies by use]   
Rotating Vote     
Partition/Sale of Company/Assets   [Varies by use] [Varies by use] 
Common Alternatives When Deadlock Mechanisms Fail or Are Absent 
Involuntary or Judicial Dissolution     
Custodianship or Receivership     
Injunction     
Specific Performance     
Judicial Expulsion     
Mediation     
Arbitration     
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